Standing Committee E

[Mr. Alan Hurst in the Chair]

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill

Clause 59 - Adjudicators

Angela Eagle: I beg to move amendment No. 202, in page 33, line 6, leave out 'shall' and insert 'may'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 203, 206, 204 and 205.

Angela Eagle: The clause relates to the appointment and functions of adjudicators, and is designed to replicate the effect of section 57 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. It requires the Lord Chancellor to appoint adjudicators, as now, and sets out the criteria for appointing them and the functions that he may assign to them. It also requires him to appoint a chief adjudicator, as now, and requires the chief adjudicator to perform such functions as the Lord Chancellor may assign. It will allow the Lord Chancellor to appoint a deputy chief adjudicator, who will be able to act for the chief adjudicator if he or she is unable to act or is unavailable. The deputy chief adjudicator will also be able to perform such functions as the chief adjudicator delegates or assigns.
 On Amendment No. 206, schedule 4 makes further provision about the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and follows on from clause 78, which provides for the continuation of the tribunal. It restates schedule 2 of the 1999 Act, but with the important addition in paragraph 3 that the Lord Chancellor is required to appoint as president of the tribunal someone who holds, or has held, high judicial office. We propose to amend the provisions that apply to a deputy chief adjudicator who acts for the chief adjudicator or president if he is unable to act or is unavailable. That will retain the current procedure. The amendment reflects more accurately the intent of paragraph 2(3) of schedule 2, and paragraph 1(4) of schedule 3 to the 1999 Act. 
 On amendment No. 203, schedule 3 follows on from the clause, which sets out the criteria for appointment. It makes provision for the terms of office for adjudicators, the appointment of staff, and remuneration, and replicates the effect of paragraphs 3 to 7 of schedule 3 to the 1999 Act, although paragraph 6(2) is restated in the clause. 
 Amendment No. 204 refers to schedule 4. Amendment No. 205 also refers to schedule 4, and relates to the definition of a legally qualified tribunal member. It ensures that all persons appointed as legally qualified members of the tribunal have legal or 
 other experience that makes them suitable for appointment. 
 The amendments clarify that the Lord Chancellor has the power to pay such remuneration, allowances and expenses as he may determine. They also ensure that he has the power to pay allowances to staff, adjudicators and tribunal members.

Humfrey Malins: I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Hurst. There is a slight end-of-term feeling about this morning.
 Government amendment No. 205 deals with the Lord Chancellor's ability to appoint one ''legally qualified'' member of the tribunal. Schedule 4 contains a definition of a legally qualified person. The provisions in paragraph 12(a) to (c) are understood, but sub-paragraph (d) says that a member of the tribunal is legally qualified if he 
''is appointed by the Lord Chancellor as a legally qualified member.''
 Under amendment No. 205, however, the Lord Chancellor can appoint as a legally qualified member someone who is not legally qualified in any respect. That point is incontrovertible. I am sorry to labour it, but let us imagine that the Lord Chancellor takes the view that person X has other experience that makes him suitable for appointment. How can he appoint him as a legally qualified member when he is not legally qualified? There is no answer to that question, but I ask the Minister to produce one.

Simon Hughes: There is merit in having the job done by people who are not technically legally qualified. There is no argument about that. However, as the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) says, they should have other relevant experience, such as significant work in the immigration field. They may have given advice or worked in a solicitor's office, although not as a solicitor. They may have worked for a reputable organisation in this field, although they are not technically lawyers or otherwise legally qualified.

Humfrey Malins: Someone could, for example, have been a non-remunerated trustee in one of the great organisations and have tons of experience, although it has nothing to do with the law.

Simon Hughes: A civil servant, for example, who knows the law like the back of his hand, might now want to do something else. Opposition Members are not against the idea that people who are not lawyers may be involved, just as we have never been against the idea that judges should be drawn only from barristers. We must have a broader range of people in judicial and semi-judicial jobs, but I hope that the Minister understands that the definition should be redefined, probably on Report, so that the Bill refers to legally qualified or other appropriate people.

Angela Eagle: The Lord Chancellor may appoint someone with other relevant experience. Hon. Members have offered their thoughts on who that could be, and I welcome their recognition that other relevant experience might assist the work of the tribunals. Such experience tends to mean that someone has a law degree, for example, but has never practised. People may have qualified abroad, in
 other jurisdictions. They may have been involved in the immigration field as academics or served in that sphere abroad in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.
 The number of people who currently fall into that category is tiny. This provision is no different from what was in the 1999 Act, which has worked perfectly well. That is what the formulation of words read out by the hon. Member for Woking means in practice. Clearly, it is for the Lord Chancellor, when he makes appointments, to ensure that other experience is relevant. That is what the phrase means, so I do not think that there is any disagreement between us. The definitions in the legislation have worked well for two years, and we see no need to change them.

Humfrey Malins: There is nothing between us in the sense that we are content for people with relevant experience, gleaned from a variety of activities, to be appointed. However, those people are in a separate category from those who are legally qualified. It is no good the Bill saying that they are suitable for appointment as a legally qualified person, because they are not legally qualified. They may be suitable for appointment, but surely the Minister will accept that it does not matter how well a system has worked in the past. Something often works even though wording is inaccurate or misleading. Does she accept that we must address that point on Report so that we can distinguish between those who are legally qualified and those who are not, rather than saying that everyone is legally qualified, including those who are not?

Angela Eagle: I do not want to dance on the head of a pin, but I fear that I will have to. My understanding of the term ''legally qualified'' here is that it refers to the seven-year general qualification as defined by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. The people may be legally qualified, having received law degrees or practised in foreign jurisdictions, but they are not legally qualified under the terms of the 1990 Act. I suspect that that is what the phrase means. Such people are legally qualified in general parlance—the hon. Gentleman or I would regard them as legally qualified, because although they may have not practised or may have qualified in another jurisdiction, they have legal expertise. However, they are not legally qualified to appear before the courts before they have either done the seven-year general qualification or completed a relevant conversion course.
 That is the pin on the head of which we are dancing. There is nothing between the hon. Gentleman and me in practical terms, but I suspect that that is the meaning of the phrase that he referred to in schedule 3. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: Part 5 concerns the process of appeals. We start from the basis that we have a system in which immigration officers, either in this country or abroad, make initial decisions. Depending on what the decision is and where it is taken, a first stage in an appeal process can start, and adjudicators are most
 often the people involved at that stage. Later, we will debate the next stage, which is the tribunal, in which more than one person adjudicates. Like all other tribunal systems, it comes in the general realm of legal jurisdiction, so the case can re-enter the court system at a higher level for further appeal. Often, the law is made above the level of the Immigration Appellate Authority, for example at the Court of Appeal or House of Lords.
 That process is fundamentally right. It is right that an officer who deals with the job on a day-to-day basis should take a first decision. Families in my constituency have rung up about relatives who have arrived at Heathrow, Gatwick or Dover, and my experience is that immigration officers are reasonable in most cases. For example, such relatives may have been refused entry, but if there is no security risk or risk of breach, we have argued that they should be allowed in on concession for a day or a week pending a flight to take them back. Immigration officers are normally fair, understand the case and act appropriately, taking compassionate reasons into consideration. 
 I am grateful to the many officers whom I have had to trouble on such matters, often at weekends or bank holidays, and to staff in the Home Office, including the duty person whom I have occasionally woken up late at night or early in the morning. I still have cordial relations with them, and happily there are several, so I am not always contacting the same person. 
 I also want to pay tribute to the adjudicators. I have been with constituents to hearings and appeared before them. I hope that the Minister agrees that we must start from the basis that they should be allowed to decide the matters that appear before them. We will come later to amendments that would give the adjudicator or the appeal tribunal the power to manage their affairs. I hope that we do not remove the discretion of those who hear a case and who are trying to do justice. One of the criticisms that I will make in today's debate is of the Government's creeping intention to remove that discretion from the adjudicator and the tribunals and to hem them in by prohibiting them from doing what in justice they should be allowed to do—such as looking at hugely relevant evidence that was not available when the first decision was made. 
 The issue is one of keeping a system that works, by and large, and offers a series of opportunities for review. That system should be streamlined so that all the issues are brought together and an appellant does not have one hearing on one issue before an adjudicator one day and then have to come back for another hearing on another issue before another adjudicator the next. That would clearly be nonsense. The Government—I do not include the Minister—have a perverse and obsessive belief that going to court for a judicial review of administrative decisions is a hindrance to government. However, whether one is dealing with immigration, asylum or any other matter, it is fundamental to our constitution that the court, not Ministers, is the place of last resort. In a country with no written constitution, it is vital 
 that the independent judiciary at all levels makes decisions on the law and the facts. I hope that all hon. Members will sign up to that. One of my great concerns about the current Administration is the creeping wish to take more decisions centrally.

Alan Hurst: Order. The hon. Gentleman is going a little wide of the clause stand part debate.

Simon Hughes: I am trying to stay within it, but I shall respect your boundaries, Mr. Hurst.
 It is also important that people realise that not all the material relevant to cases may be available at the beginning of the process. All my experience, and that of my advisers, shows that the fundamental flaw in the system is not that adjudicators or immigration appeals tribunals do their jobs badly, but that there are inadequate resources to allow the current system to work well. For example, adjudicators often adjourn a case because the Home Office has not got its act together. Adjournments occur more often because the Home Office and the relevant papers, rather than the applicant, are not ready. 
 Of course there are people who will abuse the system, but if the Government are to justify taking away the discretion of adjudicators, they should undertake the work that shows the cause of delays in the system. There is always a tendency to believe that delay is caused by the lawyers of applicants or appellants, just as the Government take the view that it is always the fault of the defendant and the lawyers that court cases take so long. That is often not the case. It is often the Crown Prosecution Service, not the defendant, that is not ready. The Home Office has the opportunity to improve the system, and if it needs more money to do so, it must bid for it. It can improve the system by ensuring that its staff have files when they need them, serve the evidence when it should be served and are able to deal with matters raised by the applicant. 
 I hope that we can recognise that the weaknesses in the system are not simply caused by applicants and their lawyers or representatives spinning things out to their advantage. That happens, of course, and I have dealt with many such cases and have been as robust as anyone in telling people the score. However, the weaknesses often result from lack of resources. Let us recognise and pay tribute to the good job that adjudicators do, but let us not remove their discretion and that of the tribunals and the courts in the interest of a system, which might in theory be more efficient, and could be more efficient if the Home Office had the resources, but which might prejudice a lot of justice on the way.

Angela Eagle: We will deal with many of those points in detail later today. It is important first to establish what we want to achieve with part 5. Others may leap up and disagree with me, but I would sum it up as trying to get a streamlined system in which there is a lot more certainty about appeal rights and to make the one-stop appeal more of a reality than we managed in 1999. Some good advances were made then, and the Bill consolidates and builds on them, particularly on certification. We want simplification, we want
 streamlining and we want to ingrain the one-stop process for appeal into the system.
 I agree that there are decisions by caseworkers, there is access to the adjudicators, there is access on appeal and there is further access with statutory review on points of law to higher courts. No one can disagree with that. We also want to get a system where it is less possible for the unscrupulous to string along the system and to keep bringing up new issues to stymie the decision. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) must face up to that. 
 We all wish to see asylum cases heard through the proper process, in a fair and simple way, as quickly as possible. Currently we are talking about six months. As I said earlier, nearly 50 per cent. of new cases are heard at first level within two months and 45 per cent of appeals are heard within four months. That is the 2 + 4 = 6 timing that we discussed. We wish to speed that up, too, which is why we are talking about accommodation centres and getting that process going in a way that retains fairness. The hon. Member for Woking is even more optimistic and thinks that it can be done in six weeks. In some cases at Oakington we have shown that it is possible, but it will not be possible in all cases. 
 It is important that we determine where the problems are in the current system and how to iron them out. That is what we are trying to do. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said that we had a perverse obsession with judicial review. I do not think that we do. However, we have evidence that judicial review hearings are being used in a way that delays and incurs costs. In 2001–02, the average monthly figure for immigration and asylum cases received for judicial review was 220. From July to December 2001, 1,144 applications were received: only 149 were granted and 884 were refused. 
 Our new approaches in part 5 aim to deal with the tactic that is increasingly used to delay cases. The hon. Gentleman will see from the figures for applications granted and refused that some 80 per cent. do not have merit and make no progress. However, they achieve their objective of delaying progress on the decision. We must see what we can do to prevent that, while not denying individuals access to a fair review of what is going on. 
 The hon. Gentleman was most unfair to the Home Office in saying that it caused the majority of adjournments. The figures show that in the first three months of this year, there were 4,472 adjournments, of which 60 per cent. were due to the actions or failure to turn up of the appellants or their legal representatives. Only 15 per cent. were due to the Home Office, and we are working hard to reduce that percentage even further; 25 per cent. were due to the Immigration Appellate Authority, and Judge Hodge is working hard to reduce that figure substantially. Our approach should be to take account of such evidence, which shows that the majority of adjournments are caused by appellants and their legal representatives rather than by the administrative system. 
 I have said little about remuneration or about the administrative arrangements that the clause will allow 
 the Lord Chancellor to make, but I hope that hon. Members will accept the clause's sensible approach to the system.

Humfrey Malins: Following what the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, Conservative Members support a streamlined, efficient and fast appeal system. In my experience, the case that applicants are trying to play the system tends to be exaggerated. It is often said that defendants try to play the criminal justice system, but only a small proportion do so: many of the adjournments and administrative hiccups in the immigration and criminal justice systems are caused by the Crown, the Home Office or the prosecutor rather than the person concerned. Although I am all for improving efficiency, the powers to enforce efficiency and to be tough and harsh are best left to the judiciary in both systems rather than to an over-mighty state.

Angela Eagle: I have already told the Committee that the ratio of delays caused by the appellants to those caused by the system is 60:40. Judge Hodge is working effectively to bring down the 25 per cent. of delays attributable to the Immigration Appellate Authority. The effectiveness of some of the new administrative arrangements being put in place to reduce the number of adjournments has already been demonstrated. However, the numbers need to be driven down further. We at the Home Office are doing what we can to reduce the 15 per cent. for which we are responsible.
 We must also try to reduce the 60 per cent. caused by appellants or their legal representatives, or at least remove the incentive, or lack of a comeback, that may currently be in place if adjournments are constantly asked for, because that is a fairly obvious delaying tactic. By no stretch of the imagination are all applicants there to delay as much as possible—many want their cases heard quickly—but we must limit the potential for delay, which often comes from the more unscrupulous legal representatives who give bad advice to appellants, and the office of the Legal Services Commission is an important piece of the armoury in that respect. 
 Later, we shall debate matters such as wasted cost orders and the introduction of incentives to discourage legal representatives from indulging in such behaviour, as at present there is no comeback in that respect. We must narrow the opportunities for playing the system, although I do not say that the majority of appellants do so. Some are badly advised, and it is important for the integrity of the system to drive out such behaviour. The new administrative changes reduce the potential for playing the system.

Simon Hughes: This has been a useful debate on the first part of the system. I am sure that the Minister will pay due heed to the hon. Member for Woking, who has many years' practical experience of the system. His constituency is quite mixed; people assume that Surrey has a homogeneous white community, but Woking
 certainly has not. He will have had the same experience in his constituency as many others of us.
 I say publicly that I am happy to sign up to collaborate with the Minister and with Conservative Members to ensure that the systems reduce unwarranted and unjustified delays. When the present Foreign Secretary was Home Secretary he brought in nominees from Opposition parties to help to make Home Office statistics more coherent. Liberal Democrats happily played a part in that process, which is a sensible way of proceeding, and the more we can agree about that the better. 
 It is important to work on the basis of accurate statistics. I do not dispute the Minister's statistics; the figures showed that one sixth of cases that went to judicial review were successful, which is a significant number of cases that the court said had been handled improperly. That one in six cases would otherwise have resulted in a miscarriage of justice absolutely justifies having the right to take a case to the courts. I hope therefore that we are all signed up to that principle; we will later debate how to do it and whether there should be a judicial review or a different form of review. 
 My answer to the Minister's point about delay when matters go to judicial review is not to remove the right to judicial review of adjudicators' decisions but to put a time limit on them. I agree absolutely with the hon. Member for Woking that the time limit norms must be much more rigorous. As the Minister implied, that means that the Home Office must get its act together. The tribunal system should have the space, the staff—perhaps there should be more tribunal members—and the adjudicators to be able to do what is required. 
 There is no policy disagreement between us, although we may disagree about judicial or non-judicial review. However, there must be a method of escape if the administrative system fails, and the judicial system has proved that it is very good at developing administrative law and reviewing administrative decisions. I hope that we do not throw out that healthy baby with the unsatisfactory bathwater. 
 I agree with the Minister that legal and other representatives need a lot of improvement. I argued before the Bill was introduced that the people giving lousy advice should be rooted out. I spend much time extracting constituents from the hands of people who give bad advice—some of whom have never qualified and others of whom may be technically qualified but are hopeless—and trying to direct them to places where they can get decent advice. I repeat the controversial point that those solicitors' firms and practitioners who claim to be competent on asylum, immigration and nationality law should be certified. The Law Society argument is for self-regulation; I am not in favour of self-regulation for Members of Parliament, for the Law Society, the Bar Council, the General Medical Council or the police. Regulation should be by people who do not have a professional self-interest. I hope that the Government will consider my proposals and persuade the Lord Chancellor and the Parliamentary Secretary that if there is regulation 
 of those who do this work in the legal professions the system may be better and more efficient than it is at present.

Angela Eagle: There are currently 75 full-time and 398 part-time adjudicators. We are planning to appoint another 70 full-time and 128 part-time adjudicators. That will increase the capacity so that we can hear appeals more effectively. I do not want the hon. Gentleman to leave the debate believing that we are denying people access to the courts on points of law. There is a statutory review, although the hearing will not be oral. The time limits are strict: the hearing must be applied for within 10 days, and held within the next 10 days. Those time limits will provide the access that he and I want, but without the delays with which the judicial review has landed us. There will be time for those debates later in the proceedings.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 59, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 - Immigration and asylum appeals: adjudicators

Amendment made: No. 203, in page 74, line 8, leave out paragraphs 6 and 7 and insert: 
'The Lord Chancellor— 
 (a) may pay remuneration and allowances to adjudicators, 
 (b) may pay remuneration and allowances to staff of the adjudicators, and 
 (c) may defray expenses of the adjudicators.'—[Angela Eagle.]
 Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 60 - Right of appeal: general

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 427A, in page 33, line 15, after 'immigration', insert 'or nationality'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 428, in page 33, line 17, after 'immigration', insert 'or nationality'.
 No. 429, in page 33, line 38, at end insert: 
'(l) refusal of naturalisation or registration as a British citizen.'
 No. 258, in page 33, line 38, at end insert 'and ( ) decisions to remove.'

Simon Hughes: We are now dealing with the right of appeal. We know that the Bill is getting long in the tooth and a little complicated when we start to get amendments with ''A'' after them. Although the provisions are generally welcome, amendments Nos. 427A and 428 propose an appeal system for decisions on nationality as well as immigration. Amendment No. 429 would add another decision against which there can be a right of appeal. As the Minister is aware, high-profile cases periodically fall into that category. We have all been well-behaved, as we have not mentioned a specific case, although we all know which one we are thinking about.
 We discussed the criteria for turning down applicants. The Home Secretary may decide, for example, that they are not of good character. I am 
 comfortable with that entirely proper discretion, but it is good to have the ability to review it. I am willing, as always, to be told that this is not the right place, but I hope that the Minister will confirm that the Government sympathise with the proposition and will seek to accommodate it. 
 Amendment No. 258 would include the right of appeal against a decision to remove. In simple lay terms, there is currently a decision that a person cannot stay, and a decision about where they go. A topical example is someone who may be a political activist in Pakistan or India. If they are an Indian citizen and their political issue concerns their views on Kashmir, it might be held that we do not have to grant asylum and they should be able to go home, because India is a democracy. However, given their actions, they might be worried that they would be a risk if they went home. They might be a high-profile character. 
 In that case, they might want to appeal against a decision to remove them to the country from where they came, and unless they nominate somewhere else, that is where they are sent. Furthermore, circumstances might have changed by the time that the decision is formally taken. To take a similar example, if they lived in West Bengal, it might be much safer for them in the short term to go to Bangladesh. If they came from Tamil Nadu, it might be better for them to go to Sri Lanka rather than south India. 
 I do not want to over-elaborate the point, as it is fairly self-evident. People should have the right to an independent review of such a decision to remove. I hope that we give to the people in the two extra categories covered by the amendments the ability to get into the system and have their cases examined by an adjudicator. There is good authority that that is justified and possible for decisions to remove. It is not currently possible in this context for nationality decisions, but I hope that the Minister will accept the improvements that the amendment would make.

Humfrey Malins: Amendment No. 258 also concerns decisions that attract appeal rights and would insert decisions to remove into that group. Several respected bodies, including the Law Society and the Legal Action Group, have raised concerns about this issue. The Law Society has advised me that the Immigration Appellate Authority held in the Kehinde case in November 2001 that applicants served with removal directions have a right of appeal, notwithstanding that no new immigration decision has been made. However, the clause conflicts with the tribunal's approach and means a challenge to removal decisions will have to be carried out by judicial review, which as we all know is slow, cumbersome and expensive. It is therefore a less appropriate method with which to proceed. The Legal Action Group also regrets the absence of removal decisions as one of the decisions that attract appeal rights and, broadly speaking, lays out the same arguments as the Law Society.

Rosie Winterton: My hon. Friend the Minister set out clearly what we are trying to achieve in part 5, which is a streamlined system that makes the one-stop process more of a reality. I am
 glad that Opposition Members have agreed that it is desirable to try to achieve that. The clause is an important part of the process, because it sets out the types of decision that attract a right of appeal on the grounds set out in clause 62, subject to the exceptions and limitations in clauses 66 to 77.
 Part 5 will establish a new structured approach designed to avoid many of the difficulties that arose in previous legislation. I am sure that hon. Members are aware that appeals on immigration, asylum, human rights and race discrimination were dealt with in separate sections and therefore triggered in different ways. The new approach makes it much clearer that only one appeal arises from a primary decision in principle, and all relevant matters that the appellant wants to raise will be dealt with at that appeal. 
 There is little change to the categories of applicants who can appeal, or to the grounds that they can advance, but we have taken this opportunity to remove some categories of appeal where an alternative approach is available, or the appeal is a waste of time because the appellant cannot benefit. 
 We have extended appeals in deportation cases to those where the decision is taken following a court recommendation, but again the appeal will be a one-stop appeal, which will prevent the person from delaying removal. We argued previously that an appeal to the court, rather than an immigration appeal, was sufficient protection, but our extended one-stop procedure cannot apply to the courts, so we shall provide an immigration appeal but ensure that it is a final appeal. 
 Taken together, amendments Nos. 427A and 429 would create a right of appeal to an immigration adjudicator against the refusal to grant British citizenship by registration or naturalisation. We appreciate the concern about decisions where there is no formal right of appeal, but I remind the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey that the case for an appeal is met to some extent by existing procedures and new provisions in part 1. 
 Clause 7 repeals the Secretary of State's statutory exemption from the common-law obligation to give reasons for his discretionary decisions. In practice, however, reasons are already given in all cases, and there is a long-standing policy of re-examining and, where it seems justified, reversing contested nationality decisions. Caseworkers have been given clear instructions on that. If maladministration is alleged, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration may be asked to investigate. Clause 7 removes the limitation on the power of the courts to review discretionary nationality decisions by enabling decisions to be subject to a normal judicial review. That will include consideration of the reasonableness of the Secretary of State's decision. 
 In general, however, we believe that no one has an absolute right to acquire citizenship of another country. In the United Kingdom, it is for Parliament to lay down the conditions for acquisition of British 
 citizenship and the rights and privileges that go with it. Under the British Nationality Act 1981, the route to British citizenship for foreign nationals is by way of an application for registration or naturalisation, and in most cases that is granted at the Secretary of State's discretion. Furthermore, as the hon. Gentleman said, that Act requires any applicant for naturalisation to satisfy the Secretary of State that he or she is of good character. 
 The decision to grant citizenship should be one for the Secretary of State. The introduction of a full right of appeal, as proposed in the amendment, would result in the transfer of that discretion to the appellate body. That would mean that whenever an appellate body took a different view from the Secretary of State on a particular case, a precedent would be set and the Secretary of State's hands would be tied—in not only that but future cases. It is proper to draw a distinction between a decision not to grant citizenship and a decision to withdraw citizenship already acquired or granted. After careful consideration, the Government have decided that they are justified in conceding a full right of appeal against deprivation of citizenship and allowing only judicial review of discretionary nationality decisions. 
 Amendment No. 258 goes against the principle of the one-stop system that was introduced in the 1999 Act and is taken up in the Bill. It would introduce decisions to remove as a further decision that attracts a right of appeal. However, ''decisions to remove'' is a vague term that covers a number of possible situations, some of which amount to a primary in principle decision that a person may not stay any longer; such decisions should be appealable, but those situations are already clearly covered in the clause, particularly in subsection (2)(h) to (j). 
 Other decisions could amount to a consequential decision to take steps towards implementing the first decision, against which there was a right of appeal. If the person has appealed and lost, or chosen not to appeal, there is no reason why there should be a further opportunity to appeal. The person can be in no doubt that he must leave the United Kingdom as a result of the primary decision, and if he fails to do so voluntarily it is fair that steps be taken to remove him without further prevarication. 
 For example, if a person is refused leave to enter the United Kingdom, the purpose of such refusal is to prevent entry. If he does not leave, removal directions must be issued to a carrier to remove him; that would amount to a decision to remove, but it is unacceptable that that should result in a further right of appeal. If it were, that would almost constitute a reward for failure to comply with the direction that had been sent and would be a way out of a decision that had already been upheld by an independent adjudicator, a tribunal and possibly a higher court. 
 However, where a decision to remove has been taken and further representations made, some will argue that a refusal to reverse the decision amounts to yet another decision to remove. The removal directions to carriers might sometimes have to be changed for technical or administrative reasons, such as the cancellation of a flight. The clause has been 
 carefully drafted precisely to avoid such difficulties. It brings together all the primary decisions that could attract rights of appeal. The one-stop system ensures that everyone who wishes to not only has the opportunity to draw attention to any matter that may result in an appeal right but may be required to do so. Having had the opportunity to appeal, they may not have another unless completely new circumstances have arisen. I hope that that explanation persuades the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Simon Hughes: The hon. Member for Woking may take a view on the matter that he and I jointly raised, but I am happy to consider the Minister's comments to see whether the three specific grounds in subsection (2)(h) to (j) cover all the usual eventualities. I appreciate where the Government are coming from on registration and naturalisation. I do not disagree with the Minister that there is an appeal process for the withdrawal of citizenship. I am also aware that part 1 clarifies the law and makes it catch up with practice, so that when decisions are made reasons are given.
 I also accept that there is the judicial review option. However, the circumstances are slightly odd. The Government say that they are happy about judicial review but do not want an appeal system. We will later have a debate in which they will say that they are happy about the appeal system but do not want something in the traditional form of a judicial review. The Minister says that it is a judicial review, but it is only on the papers. 
 There are grounds on which it is perfectly proper for there still to be an appeals system. First, people can acquire British citizenship by marriage. That is normal. A non-British citizen who marries a British citizen is entitled to seek citizenship once a sufficient period has passed to show that the marriage is genuine. Again, I appreciate that some countries do not allow dual citizenship and others do. If an application for citizenship is turned down, there should be not just a judicial review option but an appeal option. That might prevent the judicial review option from having to be triggered. 
 Secondly, people apply for British citizenship on the basis of length of residence in this country. That is perfectly normal. Some people can be here all their life without wishing to apply, but an application will normally be considered after 10 years. In such cases it may be proper to have an appeals system as well as judicial review. 
 Finally, children might seek naturalisation or British citizenship in order to have the same citizenship as their parents, or vice versa, and other family groupings may apply. I ask the Government to think about that. I shall also think about the issue and take advice on what the Minister has said, but I believe that Ministers and civil servants should reconsider some cases, if not all of them. I would be happy if we could reach agreement before Report stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Rosie Winterton: I beg to move amendment No. 3, in page 33, line 21, at end insert
'under section 10 of this Act'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 251, 347, 355, 371, and 372.

Rosie Winterton: Amendments Nos. 347 and 355 are clarificatory.

Simon Hughes: That is good.

Rosie Winterton: Yes, it is an excellent phrase.
 The amendments are clarificatory in that, except in relation to the payment of a fee, the procedure for applying for and issuing a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode is presently unregulated. Clause 10 makes provision for regulation of those matters and redefines ''certificate of entitlement'', where that term occurs in the Immigration Act 1971, by reference to the new procedures. By referring to clause 10, the amendments will ensure that references to certificates of entitlement for appeals purposes in part 5 have the same meaning as under the 1971 Act. 
 Under amendment No. 251, if a person ceases to be a refugee and has his indefinite leave revoked, he will have a right of appeal against that decision and will be able to raise any grounds listed in clause 62 at the appeal. If removal is intended, a decision to remove by way of directions under section 10 of the 1999 Act will follow on immediately from the revocation of indefinite leave, in order to enforce departure. The issuing of removal directions will be consequential to the revocation decision. There can be no reason to justify it resulting in another right to appeal when all relevant arguments against removal may be raised at the appeal against the decision to revoke. 
 Removal may not take place while an appeal against revocation is pending by virtue of clause 57. If the appellant is successful at appeal, there can be no removal because indefinite leave will be restored. If a person's indefinite leave has been revoked but he is granted further leave and removal subsequently becomes possible, the leave can be curtailed or the person can be refused an extension when that leave expires. He will accordingly have a further right of appeal at that time. In those circumstances, the appeal will be against the decision to curtail or vary leave or to refuse to vary leave to remain. 
 As for amendments Nos. 371 and 372, a series of Government amendments have already been tabled to make all references to certificates of entitlement refer back to clause 10, which governs those certificates. The definition of the term is set out in clause 10(5). The definition in clause 89 is therefore unnecessary and potentially confusing. The reference to ''that Act'' in line 31 makes no sense if line 29 is deleted, so we need to amend line 31 to show which Act is meant. 
 I hope that I have given a comprehensive explanation of the Government amendments and that the Committee will accept them.

Simon Hughes: I always smile when Ministers are asked to table amendments to Bills that have only just
 come from the same source as the amendments. That shows that the word processing is not yet under control. There is an argument for consolidation of legislation. I hope that Ministers will confirm at the end of the Committee stage that they will consider a consolidating Act, which they have done for other legislation, that will pull together the dozen or so pieces of immigration, asylum and nationality legislation. For those who are trying to work their way around the legislation, one Act is more likely to illuminate than 10 Acts spread over 50 years.
 The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department argued convincingly for a card to replace the various bits of paper showing the status of an asylum seeker to allow them access to facilities. We agreed that we need a system that prevents fraud and forgery, and is secure. The amendments seem fine, although I will read tomorrow's Hansard to see what the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department said to ensure that I still think that they are fine. 
 However, the amendments do not offer anything more firm and reliable than the bits of paper issued at various points in the certification process. I understand that someone may be given leave to remain or a direction for removal, which can be adjusted depending on the circumstances. I ask Ministers to consider a safer system. It is often to the applicant's advantage to have something that everyone recognises is valid. The Parliamentary Secretary may have constituency experience, as I do, of people who have gone to the local authority, benefits agency or social services department, but no one is clear about their status. They may be here legally, but may have interim status as they are between decision and adjudicator, or adjudicator and tribunal, or they may have an appeal against a direction for removal. What someone is entitled to as a result of that is often unclear.

Alan Hurst: Order. We are beginning to move to a Third Reading type of debate.

Simon Hughes: I was trying not to do that, but I could not have made that point elsewhere.

Angela Eagle: Other than on Third Reading.

Simon Hughes: Indeed. I would be grateful if Ministers could consider the matter at the appropriate time, and respond.

Rosie Winterton: Of course we are prepared to consider all those issues as we continue to develop ideas, but provision for identification needs to be in primary legislation.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 251, in page 33, line 31, leave out '10' and insert '10(1)(a), (b) or (c)'.—[Ms Rosie Winterton.]

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 399, in page 33, line 40, at end insert:
'(4) An explanatory statement of the reasons for refusal will be despatched to the appellant and the appellant's legal representative (if any) within one month from receipt of the notice of appeal for 
non-settlement applications, and within three months for settlement applications. 
 (5) The respondent to an appeal under this section shall be stopped from presenting a case against the appellant if there is a failure to comply with the provisions in subsection (4).'
 A glance at the title of the Bill reveals that the central word is immigration. My amendment is designed to focus our minds on immigration appeals. Some say, with much merit, that it is a great omission for a Bill with such a title not to introduce a measure that would facilitate and speed up immigration appeals, especially when there is considerable emphasis on speeding up asylum appeals. It is a great shame that students and people coming here for permanent settlement sometimes have years of their lives wasted and irreparably prejudiced through bureaucratic incompetence. On Second Reading, several hon. Members referred to immigration appeals. The hon. Member for Leicester, South (Mr. Marshall) said: 
''There is one glaring problem that the White Paper and Bill fail to address: the appalling delay in the immigration system, and in particular, the time that it takes to appeal against a refusal to be brought before the Immigration Appellate Authority. The Government have shown, especially in asylum cases, that the process can be speeded up if there is the will to do so. I just hope that the Home Office shows the same regard to people who are waiting in the immigration queue for their appeals to be settled.''—[Official Report, 24 April 2002; Vol. 384, c. 367.]
 That was one of several comments that focused on immigration appeals, which the Bill seems hardly to address. 
 Not long ago, I tabled a series of written questions designed to tease out some information from the Government. The answers show that although there are targets for entry clearance officers, they are not monitored. Worse still, there are not any targets, let alone monitoring, for how long an explanatory statement should remain in the Home Office. My amendment would do two things. First, it would revert to the old practice of sending explanatory statements by post to the appellant and to their representative, if there were any, thus saving time and bypassing the Home Office. The Immigration Appellate Authority should be able to handle that administratively now that it has a centre at Loughborough. Secondly, it would prevent the Home Office from opposing an appeal if there were non-compliance. 
 Why is it necessary to include the Home Office in the process? Even if the Minister has an answer to that, there is no reason why there should not be a penalty for non-compliance. If I were in a more kindly mood than the Government seem prepared to be with appellants—I refer to clause 82, which determines when an appeal will be ''treated as abandoned''—I would suggest that it could left to the discretion of the adjudicator to decide whether the Home Office should be able to contest the appeal. That would soften my position on the amendment. 
 One written question was: 
''To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will state against each category of appeal, and for the last full year for which records are kept, (a) the (i) target and (ii) actual time for despatch of explanatory statements by entry clearance officers from notification by unsuccessful applicants of their notice of appeal, (b) the time such statements are held in the Home Office before being 
sent to the Immigration Appellate Authority and (c) for what reason figures are not published in the Home Office annual report; what proposals he has for reducing the delay; and if he will make a statement.''
 The Minister replied: 
''The target time for despatch of explanatory statements from entry clearance posts to the Home Office is one month from receipt of the notice of appeal for non-settlement applications and three months for settlement applications. Information on the actual time for despatch is not available. Information on the time such statements are with the Home Office is not recorded centrally and could be obtained only at disproportionate cost. These figures were not published in the last Home Office report as they do not measure performance against a Public Service Agreement or Home Office target. The scope for reducing timescales will be kept under review as part of the substantial expansion in appeals capacity announced by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 29 October 2001.''—[Official Report, 15 January 2002; Vol. 378, c. 192–194W.]
 In effect, the answer was, ''We'll have a look at the problem'', but it has not gone away, and other parliamentary questions, including from the hon. Member for Hamilton, South (Mr. Tynan), have not drawn a more positive response. 
 My amendment is therefore designed to draw attention to immigration appeals, which are neglected in the Bill and in the action being taken by the Home Office. I hope that the amendment receives support from the Government and Liberal Democrat Members.

Simon Hughes: I strongly support the hon. Gentleman's argument and the amendment, which deals with a live issue to people outside the House. I have visited entry clearance officers at work in Bangladesh, Calcutta, Abuja in Nigeria and in Freetown in Sierra Leone, where I went last year. Those officers work well and very hard, and I have no criticism of them. They are often under-resourced. However, I must highlight the amount of effort and time involved in chasing the system. I could tell the Minister about a pile of cases in which I have had to write to the Home Office and the Foreign Office. Having to send Ministers' communications between London and Addis Ababa and every other capital city and outpost of the FCO is nonsense.
 The hon. Gentleman's proposal would provide exactly the discipline for which the Minister argued earlier. I hope that the Government will accept that, if we are to have a disciplined and streamlined system, they must be disciplined and streamlined, too. The Government should do as they would be done by. We should not ask applicants and appellants to comply with dates and deadlines when the Government do not give themselves dates and deadlines. I hope that the amendment receives support. The hon. Gentleman and I will want to return to the issue if we do not see satisfactory movement. Colleagues on both sides of the House and people throughout the country have made the case for improving this part of the system.

Rosie Winterton: The Government do not claim that everything was perfect in the cases that have been outlined, and we are certainly considering how there can be better co-ordination between the Foreign Office, the Home Office and the Immigration Appellate Authority. Obviously, that relates to entry
 clearance officers. We are aware of the concerns that have been raised, but we feel that we must improve our administrative systems. In fact, early in our discussions, Opposition Members said that it was important to ensure that we got administrative processes right before leaping to legislation. I hope that hon. Members are reassured to know that we are considering how to improve those processes to overcome some of the problems.
 With regard to the amendment, time limits for the appeals process and other procedural matters of that nature will be set out in the procedure rules to be made by the Lord Chancellor under clause 84. Comprehensive reasons for refusal are given in many cases before any appeal is lodged. We do not feel that there is a need for an explanatory statement to be given after the appeal is lodged, because it would be a waste of time and resources. 
 Under the one-stop system, the lodging of the appeal could bring additional grounds for application, which would need to be investigated and decided before the appeal papers could be finalised. How long that takes would depend on the appellant's co-operation in other matters. Putting a time limit on that would be difficult. It is unclear what would be the final effect of preventing the respondent from presenting a case if the deadline for sending an explanatory statement were not met. It would not prevent the appeal from going ahead for determination, which would place the adjudicator in a difficult position. The appeal would still have to be fairly determined on the facts, although he would not have any assistance in testing the appellant's evidence, and that could be unfair to the appellant. 
 It is unclear why, as the amendment suggests, an explanatory statement should be sent to the appellant and his representative within a time limit, but there is no mention of sending the papers to the appellate authority. The appellant and representative will already have received reasons for refusal with the decision notice by virtue of the regulations to be made under clause 83 ''Notice of immigration decision''. There is no advantage to the Secretary of State or the entry clearance officer in delaying sending the papers to the appellate authority. We are considering how we can improve the administrative process, but there is not necessarily any advantage.

Simon Hughes: I understand that there may be a technical problem with the drafting of the amendment, and that reference should be made to the Immigration Appellate Authority, but the decision notice is normally one sentence. It is rarely more than that. I have watched the process at the other end, where the assessment of the case is much longer and notes are made of all the points put by the applicant. It is not something that anyone can work on to prepare their appeals. In cases that require urgency for compassionate reasons, it is unacceptable not to have tough deadlines and to know the reasons. People cannot put the case otherwise. I like the Minister personally, but her argument is hopeless. It really is not adequate

Rosie Winterton: As I recall, we are looking into cases in which there may be a need for urgency. I take on
 board the hon. Gentleman's points about that. I can only reiterate that we do not feel that putting a time limit in those cases would be advantageous to the process, especially because of the limitations that it could put on the appeal process, which may not be in the best interests of the appellant. I reiterate that we are looking at what can be done to improve the situation administratively, which is the best way to tackle the issue.

Humfrey Malins: The Minister has twice said that the Government are looking into ways of tackling the problem. What ways is she considering, and how long has she has been considering them?

Rosie Winterton: As I said, we are looking into the administrative processes. I can set out in writing some of the details we are considering, but at present we must analyse where the difficulties occur to see what can be done to improve the situation. We are not rushing to judgment, because it is important to obtain evidence about the difficulties and then to put together an approach that will solve the problems in the longer term. We do not want to make quick proposals that do not address the real problems. The way to tackle them is to use the approach that we have adopted. I hope the hon. Gentlemen are reassured that we are aware of the difficulties and want to tackle them, but the amendments are not the way forward.

Simon Hughes: I shall be happy to support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Woking if he decides to divide the Committee on the proposal.
 I appreciate that both Ministers have only been in post since the general election, but I do not sense any urgency in their approach. The Government accepted that 18 months waiting for a routine operation was not good enough, and they are reducing it to 12 months. There must also be some delivery on the issue that we are discussing. 
 I hope that Ministers will leave the Committee having accepted that hundreds and thousands of our constituents face a nightmare scenario of grief and more grief, which is entirely the responsibility of the system for which the Government are accountable. The hon. Member for Leicester, South said, from experience, that anyone who has significant dealings with the problem knows that it is the bane of our lives as Members of Parliament and agents, and of the lives of real people in real situations who have such a hard time. 
 The Minister alluded to the urgency of the situation. If a Member of Parliament, an applicant or anyone else were able identify an urgent case and there was a streamline system to deal with it, that might alleviate some of the pain and grief. I give the example of a constituent, a woman from Sierra Leone who lived near the Elephant and Castle. She was dying and wanted to see her son, who had had to leave Sierra Leone and was living in the Gambia, but he was not able to get here before his mother died. Of course, such things happen occasionally, but it was not acceptable in that case as there was plenty of time for him to get here. The system must work better than that. The 
 man's mother died at Easter last year, but the appeal still has not been heard, which is awful. It is a year later and he has still not been able to see his father and to pay his respects to his mother. 
 I regularly deal with similar cases, which may involve a bereavement or an illness, a wedding, a christening or a graduation. The system is not compassionate, and the promise on the Home Office logo of firmness, fairness and justice is not being delivered. 
 One line on the notice gives a summary of the reasons for the decision, but people need to see the explanatory statement as soon as possible, as it gives the record of the interview and sets out the matters that may be agreed. There are often disputes about facts and misrepresentation. Sometimes there are linguistic problems: people may say that they speak good English, but do not. They may be on their own, and have not made their case well. There may have been some misunderstanding about the whereabouts of their family or children, how long they have lived somewhere, or whether they own their house. I understand how decisions have been arrived at technically, but an understanding of the situation may have resulted in an appeal being allowed, as it has in other cases. Instead, we wait for days, weeks, months and sometimes years. 
 I shall leave my vote in the hands of the hon. Member for Woking, but I want to return to the issue on Report if we are not satisfied in Committee. The Ministers will deal with the anger in the House if they return on Report with clear proposals for deadlines such as those we have proposed. I give them notice that we must have deadlines before the Bill leaves this place. They must be tough with their officials so that they can deliver for asylum seekers as they do for other people. 
 This is indirect, albeit unintentional, discrimination against immigrants and families in our minority communities. If I wanted my brother to return from living in Cyprus or working in Portugal, he could do so as he is a British citizen. The provision does not apply to me as a UK-born, white Briton, but it does to my Sierra Leonean, Ghanaian, Bangladeshi, Cypriot and Somali constituents. The Government must get a grip on the issue.

Humfrey Malins: I support the remarks made by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. The Minister says that she is aware of the concerns, as she would be. She also says that that should be a satisfactory response. It is not. As the hon. Gentleman said, the immigration appeals system is a neglected area in which there are immense delays. As he spoke, I was reminded of a constituent whose husband died in Woking some time ago. She sent for her mother and father from Pakistan to be of some comfort to her after the death, but after some time the application was turned down. There is to be an appeal. However, questions arise about the whereabouts of the explanatory statement, what it means, who will receive it, whether it will hang about in the Home Office, and when the appeal will be heard. The appeal may or may
 not be full of merit. That is not the point. In the real world, it will not be heard for six or eight months, or even a year. When my constituent needed a result, she could not get one—end of story. Some 20 months after the death of a husband, one does not need one's parents to get over a period of grieving as strongly as one does 20 minutes, 20 hours or 20 days after the bereavement. My constituent is facing such a problem, but I can do nothing about it. I can ring the MPs' hotline, but that are all over the place.
 The amendment seeks to persuade the Government to get the system in order. I have pressed the Minister on that, and have asked her to specify what ways to improve the system she is considering. As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, it is not yesterday's problem but one that has been hanging around for as long as most of us can remember. Home Office officials have consistently failed to produce a system that works in practice and with efficiency. I ask the Minister again: how long has the Home Office been aware that it is a problem? Six weeks, six months or longer? There must have come a day when it realised there was a problem—when was that day? What work has been done since? What proposals have been drafted? What measures have Home Office staff suggested to Ministers should be tagged on to the 1999 Bill or any other Bill? The talk that we are hearing from the Government takes us nowhere. 
 Surely draftsmen are entirely capable of producing a clause that is better drafted than my amendment and which ties up aspects of the process in a way that my amendment does not. Cannot the Minister tell draftsmen to get something on the books by the time the Bill comes back on Report? I ask the Minister to recognise that the problem is serious and, more than that, to do something about it. Constituency cases all round the country would be affected by the general nature of the amendment. We cannot afford to leave the issue for an indefinite period, because genuine hardship is experienced in cases involving students, family resettlements or whatever. An appeal may be turned down because a case is frivolous, but that is not the point. The point is that a case needs be dealt with properly and with due speed, otherwise there is a sense of discrimination. That is nowhere a greater problem than in cases in which people need immediate support in this country.

Simon Hughes: There are also knock-on consequences. I can think of a case in which the mother of a family died and the father wanted someone to come and help him to look after the children so that he could keep his job, otherwise he would have had to give up his job and be dependent on the state. It is not a ring-fenced problem. There must be plenty of officials in the Home Office who have had personal experience of such issues. I hope that our joint message is getting across.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman is right.
 The Minister almost offered—I should be grateful if she would make it a firm offer—to write to Opposition Members setting out the areas which the Government are considering. All Opposition Members would appreciate a letter explaining how long the 
 Government have recognised the problem and what proposals they are considering to improve the situation. Opposition Members have said enough this morning for the Government to be well aware that the issue is important. In a Bill that concerns immigration as well as asylum, it has been sadly neglected. The Minister will know that if the position is not made more satisfactory relatively quickly, there will be firmer and stronger opposition from all Opposition Members. 
 I will not press my amendment to a vote. Voices from our side of the Committee have been strong in support of the principle behind the amendment, and the Government can be under no illusion that we believe strongly that there must be rapid progress on the matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 60, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 61 - Appeal: claim for asylum

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 400, in page 34, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).

Alan Hurst: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 430, in page 34, line 1, at end insert 'limited'.
 No. 431, in page 34, line 2, leave out 'exceeding one year'.

Humfrey Malins: Amendment No. 400 would ensure that applicants granted temporary leave of up to one year could appeal against the rejection of their asylum claim. Applicants who are granted temporary leave of a year or less should be able to access the appeal process to pursue their claim. If that right is denied, there is no bar to the Secretary of State granting periods of leave consecutively, thereby denying individuals the right to refugee status and consequently the right to be reunited with family members. That is particularly worrying for children, as they are frequently granted leave to enter or remain for periods of less than one year up to their eighteenth birthday. A respected NGO suggested this probing amendment.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful that you selected amendments Nos. 430 and 431 in this group, Mr. Hurst. Although they represent lesser opportunities, there is a set of options before Ministers, and I shall give an example to reiterate the importance of the issue that they address. I am happy that amendment No. 400 is a probing amendment at this stage.
 Amendments Nos. 430 and 431 deal with live issues that often come our way from families. There is obviously an advantage to applicants in having a status that allows them to be here legitimately, rather than having no status. However, I am sure that Ministers understand that if someone is given a limited stay when they believe that they have a claim to something better, their demand is clearly not being met. That is the reason for the amendments. If someone is allowed in for a brief period, it should be 
 possible for them to put their case for being able to stay here indefinitely and for it to be reheard on its merits. 
 I do not have the figures in my head—I may never have seen them—but limited leave is often given when a claim has been made for indefinite leave. When considering Home Office statistics on the number of asylum applications that are granted, we have to add up the numbers originally granted and the people who succeed on appeal. Then there are those who are given alternative rights to be here as extended leave to remain. Some may be given indefinite leave to remain, and others are sometimes allowed to stay on other grounds. 
 Contrary to the views of people at the Daily Express and others, by the end of the process about half of all those who put their case to come here stay legitimately, because their cases are accepted under one heading or another. Perhaps if the Labour party paid some money to the Daily Express, rather than the other way round, it might be persuaded to get the facts and figures right and report matters a little more accurately, like those journalists who try to give a balanced view. 
 I hope that people understand that individuals are often perfectly content to get some status on a temporary basis, which clause 61(1)(b) deals with, but they want to be able to continue their case. As a matter of law and justice, the application that we are discussing should be put on the same basis as other applications, and get in the slipstream to the adjudicator and so on. I hope that we will have a positive response from the Government.

Rosie Winterton: Clause 61 is a much-simplified version of section 69(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which provides a right of appeal for people who have been refused asylum but granted leave to remain exceptionally. It is often called an upgrade appeal and complies with international obligations. The original clause has caused many technical problems at appeal and does not reflect the standard procedure in such cases. For example, it is unnecessary to refuse leave to enter on asylum grounds when rejecting an asylum claim and granting exceptional leave to enter, but the right of appeal depends on both immigration decisions being carried out.
 The clause will allow a specific upgrade appeal when the asylum claim is rejected and leave is granted exceptionally, provided that the leave is for more than one year. The appeal is specifically against the rejection of the asylum claim, and other grounds cannot be put forward. In that sense, it is not a one-stop appeal. The appeal is not available for those given a year's leave or less, because that is a deliberately limited period and a further decision will have to be taken at the end of it. If that decision is to refuse further leave or to grant more than a year's further leave, it will attract a right to appeal.

Simon Hughes: The Minister is right. I have no idea of the figures, but in practice people are often given extensions of a year or less, which do not attract a right of appeal. Putting it bluntly, the process could be spun out by recurrent extensions so that no right of appeal is allowed for a long time.

Rosie Winterton: I hope that I can reassure the hon. Gentleman by saying that we do not intend to use the system in that way.
 Amendments Nos. 400, 430 and 431 would allow failed asylum seekers who have been given a short period of exceptional leave to remain—12 months or less—to appeal against the decision to refuse asylum. If it is decided at the end of the period that they are able to return to their own country, they would then have a further right of appeal against any decision to seek to remove them. 
 I should give some reassurance about how we believe that the process will work, as there has been some misunderstanding. If a person arrives from a country that is in turmoil and their claim for asylum is rejected, they may be given exceptional leave to remain because it is felt that it will be safe for them to return at the end of the 12-month period. If a decision is made at the end of that period to remove the person, he or she can appeal on the grounds of asylum. Asylum considerations will be taken into account at that point and the appeal revisited. 
 That is how we see the system working, and we do not believe that the system will be used year after year to grant continuous periods of exceptional leave to remain. The amendment would increase the number of likely appeals. The system that we have instituted is fair, and to introduce more appeals would, as I hope the hon. Gentleman agrees, run counter to earlier statements about the need for a system that is fair and robust but which streamlines rather than increases the number of appeals. 
 I hope that, with those reassurances, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Humfrey Malins: I have listened carefully to the Minister. Opposition Members save votes for critical moments—not in the sure and certain knowledge that we will win them, but because the fewer votes we press for, the more respected they will be. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62 - Grounds of appeal

Rosie Winterton: I beg to move Government amendment No. 342, in page 34, line 20, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—
'(d) that the appellant is an EEA national or a member of the family of an EEA national and the decision breaches the appellant's rights under the Community Treaties in respect of entry to or residence in the United Kingdom;'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 343 and 356.

Rosie Winterton: The clause is a key part of our one-appeal philosophy and lists all the grounds for an appeal under clause 60. An appeal can be lodged on one or more grounds but all the grounds must come within those listed. The grounds are listed in different places in part 4 and schedule 4 of the 1999 Act but are brought together for simplicity. They refer specifically to human rights, asylum, European Economic Area obligations and race discrimination. The appeals documentation sent to the subject of the adverse decision will require him to lodge the grounds that apply to his case and, crucially, warn him that if he fails to lodge any relevant grounds at a later application, he may not attract a right of appeal if refused. Any grounds put forward that were not put forward prior to the decision, for example a human rights claim that the decision is contrary to the person's human rights, will be addressed in the one-appeal process.
 Government amendments Nos. 342, 343 and 356 are technical amendments. Amendment No. 342 includes the ground that the appeal may be based on a claim that the decision breaches the applicant's rights under the Community treaties in respect of entry and residence in the UK. Those rights are described in the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2000. The amendment is necessary to preserve existing appeal rights. Government amendment No. 343 defines the criteria for those who can benefit from the Community treaties in respect of entry and residence in the UK, which is in line with earlier definitions. 
 Clause 71 defines which appeals are suspensive—that is to say, they may be exercised in the United Kingdom, as in the case of European Economic Area nationals and their family members who may not be removed while an appeal arising from an immigration decision made under clause 60 is pending. Amendment No. 356 permits EEA nationals and their family members to appeal in the United Kingdom against any immigration refusal made while the applicant is in the UK, which preserves existing appeal rights. 
 These are technical amendments, which will clarify the position and preserve existing appeal rights, and I hope that hon. Members will accept them.

Simon Hughes: Amendment No. 342 would change the wording in the clause as drafted, which refers to the Community treaties and UK obligations, to one that defines the person as having to be an EEA national or a member of that person's family. Are we talking about nationals of European Union countries or about the nationals of the old European Free Trade Association countries? Am I right in thinking that slightly different matters relate to the old EFTA country nationals, apart from those from Ireland, which has a different status? Are nationals from those countries covered in the proposal or elsewhere? I ask that question in ignorance; there may be an easy answer to it.

Rosie Winterton: We are talking about the wider economic area. I did not hear the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question, so perhaps he will repeat it.

Simon Hughes: I understand and appreciate that the Minister was talking to a colleague. If we are talking about what used to be called, and perhaps still is, the European Free Trade Association area, which the amendment refers to as the EEA—the European Economic Area—can the Minister tell us whether there is a difference in the Bill between the way in which a Swiss national and a French national would be treated under the system? The latter person is from a country in the European Union and the former is from a country in the wider area but not in the EU. I am trying to discover whether there is a difference in the system and, if so, how it works.

Rosie Winterton: Briefly, we are talking not about EFTA but about the European Economic Area; there is no difference in the way they are treated.
 Amendment agreed to.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 401, in page 34, line 34, leave out paragraph (b).
 Clause 62(1)(b) puts a heavy, and perhaps unfair, burden on the appellant to produce documents before the case is heard. For example, the production of the documents could be in the hands of an overseas authority, not of the person seeking to appeal. One of the objectors to subsection (2) has been the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UNHCR rightly points out that, although there is a legitimate wish to ensure that asylum seekers who appeal against the decision to send them to another country should be able to show that they will be received there, subsection (2) raises concerns about cases where asylum seekers have been unable to prove which country they came from. People fleeing persecution frequently arrive in the UK without documentation because they have not had the time to collect all their personal belongings. 
 Paragraphs 196 and 197 of the UNHCR handbook stress that point and state: 
''In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents . . . The requirement of evidence should thus not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.''
 Perhaps the subsection should provide a waiver of that requirement or, at the very minimum, the Government could make a commitment that the requirement will not be construed too strictly against the applicant in question.

Simon Hughes: The amendment has the support of both Opposition parties. I hope that the Government will be positive towards it. I appreciate that subsection (2) concerns an appeal only on the ground of removal as set out in subsection (1)(h). It suggests that the appellant has a double duty. First, he must specify a country other than the one to which it is proposed to remove him. Secondly, he must submit documentary evidence to the Secretary of State before the appeal is commenced. I know from practical experience that that is nonsense. I assume that the phrase
''before the appeal is commenced''
 could be interpreted as being before one submits the appeal application. If it were redrafted, it could say 
 ''before the appeal hearing begins''. That would not be perfect, but it would be better. If that is what the subsection is meant to say it would be helpful to know that, but it does not say that as far as I can see. 
 The hon. Member for Woking made the case that there all sorts of practical reasons, not least when it is a long time before one appeals and the appeal is heard, why putting the burden on appellants to provide both the country specification as an alternative destination and, subject to the amendment, documentary evidence that shows that they would be allowed to enter, is not practically deliverable. Appellants may have requested the documentary evidence. They may be able to certify that they have requested it. They may have good reasons to believe that it is available but they cannot be certain until they get the documents in their hands. 
 As Ministers and civil servants know well, in the real world dealing with that international transfer of documents would not be possible within the time scale. Someone who came from Iraq and was willing to go back to another country in the middle east would be very unlikely to get the necessary documents through the embassies in time. That would be much more likely under the timetable for the appeal hearing. The knowledge of a date for an appeal hearing often produces much speedier responses. 
 Information changes. Later there will be debates about whether the time by which decisions should be made and appeals should be determined is the original date and the circumstances surrounding it or the date of the appeal. We will put in different ways the case that one must allow evidence to be added to up to the date the appeal is heard. Things change: countries that were at war are at peace, and vice versa. It is therefore important to give people flexibility. A Government may change, or elections may be due, and a country that may not be willing to take someone on the day ''the appeal is commenced'' could reasonably allow that by the date on which the appeal is heard. I can think of many countries where that would regularly apply. 
 I hope that the Government will realise that the amendments are eminently sensible for practical reasons. Subsection (2)(b) is far too restrictive and will preclude justice on many occasions.

Rosie Winterton: We strongly disagree with the idea that that would be practical, largely because there would be no point in not ensuring that someone would be accepted in a country that he or she nominated. If that person was not going to be accepted, he or she would simply be shuttled backwards and forwards, to the benefit of no one. The immigration service would usually be willing to remove someone to another country if that person so wished and if it were physically possible. At the same time, it is important that the service knows that the authorities in that country would be content to accept that person.

Simon Hughes: Will the Minister put on record how long an appellant has between a decision to remove to a particular destination and an application for appeal?
 I understand that the period is no more than four weeks.

Rosie Winterton: I understand that the period is 10 days.
 On the need to produce documentation, we strongly believe that if a person objects to removal to a certain place, it is not enough for that person to say that he or she wishes to go somewhere else. The adjudicator would need proper evidence of a person's acceptability in another country. Certain people coming to the United Kingdom from elsewhere would not be admitted without a visa. It is only right, therefore, that the evidence should be documentary proof of acceptability. Without that proof, an appeal should not proceed. If we allowed appeals to proceed without documentary evidence, there would be no point in having the appeal, and it would merely clog up the system. We have been trying to avoid pointless appeals, which are a waste of everyone's time, not least the appellant's.

Simon Hughes: It would be helpful if the Minister defined ''appeal is commenced''. If a direction for removal was set for an Iraqi to return to Iraq, and they wanted to put a case for them to be sent to Canada where they had a cousin, does she seriously believe that even the efficient Canadian high commission would be able to determine within 10 days whether they should be admitted? If she does, she is not in the real world.

Rosie Winterton: I should say first that, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman knows, we do not return people to Iraq, although I take his general point.
 I am sure that people in such situations will be aware that it is within their rights and ability to put together documentary evidence before the 10-day period to prove that they are acceptable in another country. There is nothing to stop people doing that. I understand the hon. Gentleman's point about the 10-day period, but if people are considering transfer to another country as an option, I am sure that they will be aware of the possibilities at the end of the appeals process. If they are thinking about saying that they want to go to another country, there is nothing to stop them trying to obtain evidence before then. 
 However, it is impractical to suggest having appeals in which no evidence says that if a person were put on a plane to a different country, they would be allowed in and not simply returned. We require the evidence, because otherwise there is no point in making the arrangements that must be gone through to carry out the removals process.

Simon Hughes: There is nothing between us in half of what the Minister says. When the appeal is heard, there must be evidence before the appellate authority that another country will take person X. The question is by what date they must produce the evidence. Surely it will be sufficient to produce the evidence when the appeal starts to be heard, or perhaps the previous working day, so what does the phrase ''the appeal is commenced'' mean?
 If someone was concentrating on claiming asylum here, and then heard today that they were to be turned 
 down, they would be able to address where they might go only now. It is not realistic for individuals to think about where they might go if their application to stay here fails. They want to stay here, and even if they wanted to go somewhere else, getting their act together with most embassies and high commissioners in the world in 10 days is impossible. In practice, the clause will mean that except in the most exceptional circumstances, people will not have an appeal.

Rosie Winterton: I can see that we are not going to agree on this point. I must reiterate that we do not want to delay removals because a person says that they are admissible to another country without any evidence to back that up. If they have the evidence, the immigration and nationality directorate will remove them to the country concerned. There is no question about that. If the documentary evidence exists to prove that they will be accepted, a move will go ahead. There is no reason why it should be opposed, but the evidence must be available to us.
 I can see why the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey is concerned and I understand his points about gathering evidence together. However, we need to set up a system that enables us to ensure that nothing frustrates the process when removals have been decided. 
 In doing so, we must consider the most effective way of confirming that it is not a problem if someone has a country to go to other than the one that we indicated. However, we need evidence, which we believe it is possible to produce. We can be certain that someone will be accepted and not waste flights only if we have that evidence. I hope that that is reassuring.

Simon Hughes: I have said many times that I am unconvinced. If the Minister wants me to, I will write to six embassies or high commissions, chosen at random and agreed with her, and ask them how long it takes them on average to determine an application to come to their country? All my experience indicates that none of them would be likely to state that they could definitely do so within 10 days. The documents are often in another place, such as with the Home Office, and it is a nightmare to retrieve them. The Home Office loses them half the time. I regularly receive apologies from it for having lost passports.
 Before the Minister concludes her remarks, will she tell us where we can find the definition of ''appeal is commenced''? The position is improved if it is defined in the Bill as being on the day on which the appeal hearing starts. However, it is surreal politics if it means the day that the appeal is lodged. I pray that the Government will see the nonsense of the argument. This is not real-world stuff, and I ask them to reflect on it before Report, where we will want to pursue it, and before it passes to the House of Lords, where I hope that sanity will prevail even if it does not in this place.

Rosie Winterton: On one of the hon. Gentleman's earlier points, subsection (1)(h) and subsection (2), when read together, make it clear that the asylum seeker, or appellant, will know at the start of the
 process that there is the possibility of removal to a country at the end of that process. That is part of the idea behind bringing everything together in one process, so that all those things are made clear from the beginning. Someone cannot decide at the last minute to find evidence of another country that they would like to go to. The hon. Gentleman used the example of Iraq, with which there are obvious difficulties, but I understand the point that he was making. It is important to clarify again the purpose of the appeal process. It is not to find someone somewhere else to go, but to propose a place where the asylum seeker knows he can go. That is why it is known from the beginning that that alternative could be proposed at the end of the process.

Neil Gerrard: Everyone welcomes the general concept of a one-stop appeal with all the cards on the table, so that at the beginning of the process the grounds of the appeal are known. We should not end up with what sometimes happens when poor advisers and solicitors try to find further reasons to appeal after they have lost a case. No doubt they make significant amounts in the process.
 I am confused by how this bit of the system will work. The argument seems to be that in order for a person to get an appeal off the ground, he must be able to go to the Home Office, specify an alternative destination and show proof that the destination would accept him. An appeal would almost certainly never be heard on those grounds. If the Home Office intended to remove a person to a specific country and that person said, ''No, I don't want to go there, but I have documentary evidence from a different country that will accept me'', what would be the point of the appeal? Surely the Home Office would say, ''Fine, you can go to that alternative country. We will remove you there.'' It seems to be a tautologous process in which we go around in a circle. If a person were able to lodge an appeal and say, ''I believe I could go to this alternative country'', he would be expected to produce evidence at the appeal that the country would take him, and if he could not do so, inexorably the case would be lost.

Richard Allan: A further consideration is whether any other country would consider an individual's papers while the process was going through in the United Kingdom. We should consider the problem the other way round. If an individual had his asylum claim processed in Canada and still had legal recourse, I would not expect the United Kingdom authorities even to look at his paperwork until the process in Canada had been completed. It is correct to suggest that the 10-day timescale is a problem. An individual who was looking for a route to Canada would not be at the top of the Canadian authority's priority list while he was in what was deemed to be a safe country—the UK.
 Alternative countries will not be interested in prioritising any claim for an individual who is in the UK. That is a major difficulty, and such an individual would have to start from scratch at the beginning of the 10-day period and would be unlikely to complete the process.

Humfrey Malins: The debate has been interesting, although I still think that the burden on the applicant is high and heavy.
 There is an issue of language. I have been thinking about the phrase 
''before the appeal is commenced''
 and I have been trying to decide its meaning. I have tried to think of another word for ''commenced'', which is not a word that you or I, Mr. Hurst, use in our normal day-to-day language. Indeed, I challenge any member of the Committee to raise intervene if they have ever used the word ''commenced'' in their normal day-to-day language. I have not, although I have used the words ''begins'' and ''starts'' quite often. 
 Let us examine what ''before the appeal begins'' might mean. Assuming that I am an appellant in a court case and someone rings to ask whether the appeal has begun, and I say, ''No, it starts or begins on Tuesday, though I lodged the appeal a fortnight or a month ago.'' What does it mean? Is the appeal commenced—the more I use that word, the uglier it becomes—on the day that it is lodged, or on the first day that the appeal starts? It is an important difference.

Rosie Winterton: Perhaps I can clarify the matter.

Humfrey Malins: If the Minister can clarify it, that will be terrific.

Rosie Winterton: The hon. Gentleman was right when he referred to the appeal being lodged.

Simon Hughes: That is a worst case scenario.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman has been trying to extract that fact from the Minister for the past quarter of an hour. She might consider redrafting the provision on Report, as it might read better if it said, ''submits to the Secretary of State before the appeal is lodged''.

Simon Hughes: Except that that is not what we want.

Humfrey Malins: At least we would know where we were. I was completely confused until a few moments ago. I look at the clock and realise that we have only five minutes before we break for lunch. The amendment raises a serious issue. The hon. Gentleman was right in saying that it is the worst case scenario for the appellant. It is wholly unrealistic. It might be a different story if it referred to the day on which the appeal began. We flagged up the issue, and although I do not mean it unkindly, the Minister has not responded adequately. However, I shall not press
 for a Division. We shall return to the issue again. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 343, in page 34, line 35, at end insert— 
'( ) In subsection (1)(d) ''EEA national'' means a national of a State which is a contracting party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area signed at Oporto on 2nd May 1992 (as it has effect from time to time).'.—[Ms Rosie Winterton.]
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: In the light of our debate a few minutes ago, I hope that the Government will reflect further on the clause. We shall not seek to divide the Committee, but we regard the last part of the clause as unsatisfactory. I would be happy to speak to Ministers about it before Report—I realise how little working time is available before then. I hope that the Home Office will urgently consider tabling an amendment that would deal with the nonsense and satisfy myself and the hon. Member for Woking.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman refers to how little working time is available between now and Report. Has he heard the same rumour that I have—that Report stage is proposed for the Wednesday after our return on 10 June?

Simon Hughes: I have heard that, but it is not confirmed. It would make improving the clause difficult. If we finish the Committee stage this evening, have three working days before the spring break and Report stage is planned for two days after our return, it will be difficult for the Government to respond to debates. The Opposition parties will be able to table amendments. People from outside with an interest in these matters will be able to read the Hansard report of today's proceedings and reflect on them, but contacting the Government and Opposition will be impracticable. Ministers should discuss with their business managers and with the hon. Member for Stirling (Mrs. McGuire) how best to ensure practicable arrangements. She will doubtless do her best to accommodate the Opposition, as she so often does.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 62, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.